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Christopher S. Beach
Unity College

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Environmentalists and opponents of oil refineries drew on popular images of the Maine coast as a tranquil and pastoral place untouched by the modern era. Images such as this early-twentieth-century photograph of Broad Cove, Eastport, stood in sharp contrast with plans for supertanker ports.

Maine Historical Photograph Collection, Fogler Library Special Collections.

Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.

SCRIPTING MAINE'S ENVIRONMENTALIST MAJORITY: THE "THEATER OF OIL," 1968-1975

BY CHRISTOPHER S. BEACH

Christopher Beach argues that Maine's contemporary environmental movement was created in the late 1960s when oil companies seeking sites for new refineries and tanker ports saw the Maine coast as ideally situated for expansion: close to southern New England and the mid-Atlantic coast, but relatively undeveloped and in need of economic re-energizing or so they thought. Hearings and conflict among fishers, state and local officials and politicians, residents (seasonal and permanent) and environmentalists created a long-term debate that in turn spawned a new understanding of Maine as a pastoral landscape for the modern world. Christopher Beach received his J.D. from the University of Maine, School of Law and his Ph.D. in Canadian-American History from the University of Maine. He is an assistant professor of History/Humanities at Unity College in Unity, Maine.

The playwrights and cast of the "Theater of Oil" were an unlikely coalition of summer people, natives, newcomers, retirees, activists new and old, journalists, lawyers, a governor, promoters, and citizens. Together they engaged in an extended public political performance that helped Mainers of all kinds redefine the state and reconstruct their understandings of region and home place. Their performance projected a new set of images of Maine to the national scene and, in the process, helped to create Maine's "environmentalist majority." Postindustrial Maine was created during an intense and dramatic period: the "Theater of Oil" opened in 1968 and closed around 1975.

According to a 1971 *Forbes* magazine article, it was now "nearly impossible to build an electric power plant, a jet airport, an open-pit mine, or a resort complex without strong protest from keep-out forces." Taken aback by this onslaught against the politics of growth, an Oregon Pacific Power and Light official articulated the rationale for industrial expansion in guarded tones: "I know that . . . development . . . conjures up the idea of smokestacks, lunch buckets, etc. and this is in conflict with the uncluttered, tranquil landscape that all of us would like to have. But I

think you will all concede . . . that [in the future] we will have lots of people here. We must plan for them, and they have to have jobs.” The *Forbes* editor mused nostalgically: “Remember when the high school band—not pickets—met those visiting industrial delegations?” In addition to posing a serious challenge to growth, local campaigns brought together a diverse collection of civic, scientific, and conservation groups, forging a new environmentalist ethic that spread quickly to other areas and concerns as the decade passed.¹

For Maine, the point of departure for popularizing the environmental movement was the coast. In 1968, Maine became embroiled in a series of oil refinery and tanker port proposals that threatened to despoil a landscape of fishing villages and seascapes synonymous with the state’s individualism and traditional way of life. Bluntly put, the issue was not the possibility of “spill[ing] a little oil,” but rather preserving a pastoral icon. “A water view . . . is a refreshment to the heart . . . We do not want to stare at oil tanks, nor have them stare back.” Opposition first arose among urban preservationists and summer home owners, but this narrow political base expanded quickly, as virtually every group with an interest in the future of the coast joined in the debate.²

Defending Maine’s rock-bound coast popularized environmental goals and bridged class and regional differences. Here again, environmentalists invoked a successful litany: drawing attention to these powerful symbols of regional identity, they rallied popular sentiment to defend the public trust against “outside” urban and industrial enemies. Pastoral images, cast in ecological terms and disseminated by energetic grassroots groups, conservation organizations, and environmental journalists, kindled a new, broad-based environmental imagination, affirming the emergence of Maine as a postindustrial “nature state.” Maine’s environmentalist majority, a central feature of its late-twentieth-century political culture, emerged from this “Theater of Oil.”³

A key example of landscape preservation, the coastal campaign in Maine demonstrates the blossoming of the environmental imagination. Threats from an easily identifiable “outside” enemy invoked a fierce defense of place, making the preservation battle incendiary, especially with the politics of growth also under siege. The controversy brought environmental organizing and environmental rhetoric to its height and forced officials to respond to popular activism with planning proposals that attempted to channel this new environmentalist energy in less confrontational directions.

In 1968, all but two percent of Maine’s coastline was in private

hands, and the most conspicuous owners were wealthy seasonal residents. Thus critics of preservation could legitimately ask who gained from locking up the coast like a “giant state park.” Up to this point, Maine politics had adhered more closely to traditional growth strategies. The textile crisis had passed, but Maine’s economic growth indicators still ranked near the bottom nationwide. Jobs, cost of living, economic growth, and taxes remained high priorities, and for these reasons, more than half the people in the state would favor oil refineries on the coast. Locally, however, Mainers rejected the specific proposals that violated their sense of place: no particular location was found to be ideal for development. Moreover, as opponents pointed out, refineries offered only limited job opportunities for local people; more often they attracted skilled workers from outside the state, people who compromised Maine’s powerful attachment to local sovereignty. Still, resolving Maine’s oil controversies was contingent on finding alternative jobs for coastal residents.⁴

From the beginning, Maine’s coastal controversy was shaped by out-of-state interests. Promoters of independent oil firms were the first to identify Maine’s undeveloped deep water coastline as a site for new refineries. The idea was embraced enthusiastically by the New England Council for Economic Development, a Boston-based regional chamber of commerce. Opposition to the refinery proposals also came first from outsiders. Maine’s summer residents raised the alarm, seconded by the New England chapter of the Sierra Club, also based in Boston. This pattern—powerful out-of-state industrialists battling sophisticated out-of-state preservationists—was typical of Maine’s early environmental politics. As the controversy unfolded, though, local interests entered the fray. By the time the oil dispute subsided, the heady process of public debate, media reports, legislative compromise, and executive management had prepared Mainers to formulate and conduct future environmental controversies on their own.⁵

The struggle to protect the coast changed Maine’s popular environmental politics in three ways. First, it galvanized an environmental establishment. It provided opportunities to build advocacy organizations and media readerships, and it opened up careers for environmental journalists, planners, consultants, and politicians. During several years of intense popular debate, these oil controversy professionals had time to refine their positions, sharpen their public images, and define issues in various public forums. Journalists refined the art of environmental analysis; public leaders tuned their rhetoric to a new environmental con-

stituency; consulting economists built careers around their planning expertise.

Second, the oil controversy had a substantial impact on public consciousness. Concern for the coast was channeled through a new legislative process: agency-sponsored public hearings on specific development issues. This grassroots stage for popular “witnessing” catapulted local citizens into the decision-making and opinion-forming process. It created a new popular consciousness, so intensely focused that the governor’s office eventually found it necessary to change both the format for public input and the planning process itself.

Third, the controversy changed the ideological configurations of Maine politics. Democratic leaders like Senator Edmund S. Muskie argued the importance of jobs and judged this against the whims of what he labeled “summer residents, visitors and suburban residents” looking after their lifestyles. In turn, preservationists cast these public officials as old-style conservationists out of touch with Maine’s new concerns. Rhetorically, the split between “new conservationists” and “old conservationists” had become clear by 1970. In fact, no oil or petrochemical complex was ever built on the Maine coast, and the controversy was brought to a close not so much by popular outcry as by national and international energy developments. But the impact of the controversy was crucial to the formation of a new popular environmental consciousness—Maine’s environmentalist majority.⁶

The dilemma of coastal development fell heaviest on Governor Kenneth M. Curtis, who held office between 1967 and 1973. To environmentalists, Curtis was an enigma: “No governor since the late Percival P. Baxter has spoken out more forcefully. . . on conservation matters,” they acknowledged, yet like all postwar Maine leaders, Curtis was a strong advocate of growth. Maine’s poor were still unable to find decent jobs, he reminded his constituents, and the exodus of rural youth undermined the state’s future. To stem this outflow, Curtis proposed intensive use of natural resources and more incentives to draw industries and tourists to Maine. Thus, despite his rhetorical support for environmentalism, Curtis remained aloof from the coastal preservation issue. “Summer people failed to apply themselves to the solution of Maine’s hinterland troubles,” he said. Having made their money off of industrial growth elsewhere, they held back industrial development in Maine. “Their fall, winter and spring habitats have become unbearably foul and now they’re worried about the summer nest.”⁷

Yet in an increasingly polarized political climate, coastal preservation



Governor Kenneth M. Curtis was an advocate for economic growth and development in the state, but he came to cooperate with the emerging “environmentalist majority.” Photograph from *The Curtis Years, 1967-1974*, edited by Allen G. Pease (Augusta, ME: Office of the Governor, 1974). *Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.*

could not be dismissed easily. Environmentalists, having cast the paper industry as the archvillain in earlier fights to save the state’s rivers, now took aim at other corporations and grew even more insistent. But labor, the core of Maine’s Democratic constituency, remained lukewarm about this environmental agenda. Curtis tried to straddle a growing gulf in Maine’s liberal constituency by insisting on statewide planning, beginning with a survey to identify Maine’s unique natural sites. Planning would ensure these sites would not be “trampled to death in the state’s rush for development profits.” To insulate development needs from the antigrowth mood threatening Maine’s fragile economy, Curtis highlighted the State Planning Office as a key administrative agency. With the icons of the nature state encased in protective law, he believed, Maine could move ahead to “broaden its economic base without detracting from its environmental integrity.” The oil controversy was an extraordinary political debate because it operated at a cultural level, not just a political level and it marked a major transition in Maine history, helping Maine people emerge from a pessimistic sense of their own marginality and helplessness. The controversy’s drama unfolded in four

acts. Act 1 raised a new question—could Maine be something other than expendable or quaint? Act 2 answered that question with a resounding “yes.” The climactic act 3 confirmed that Mainers of all kinds agreed on the new cultural definition of their state and act 4 helped institutionalize the new environmental understanding. Maine’s “Theater of Oil” firmly established the state as a national leader in the emergent national political culture centered on the values of environmentalism.⁸

Act 1. Downeast Maine: Expendable or Quaint

The controversy began in June 1968, when Governor Curtis announced a proposal to build a tanker port and refinery in the small town of Machiasport, near the Canadian border. Later that year, additional port and refinery proposals emerged for the state’s heavily populated Casco Bay, and in 1970 for Penobscot Bay, the state’s most picturesque coastal area. These projects were motivated by new oil tanker technology. East Coast ports could handle ships up to 60,000 deadweight tons, but this was only one-fifth the size of the new supertankers. Maine’s deep water harbors offered an obvious alternative.⁹

Advocates for the oil proposals first cast their arguments in terms of regional economic benefits. Among the earliest supporters of the Machiasport project was the New England Council, representing major business, labor, professional, public, financial, utility, and industrial interests. The Council was organized in 1925 by the six New England governors to deal with the textile crisis, and promoting oil was a logical extension of this earlier regional concern. Here again a natural advantage—cheap access to deep water harbors, like cheap access to water power for textile mills—could outweigh the lack of a critical resource—oil or cotton—and create a new industry. Speaking for the Council in Portland in October 1968, A. Thomas Easley argued that Maine, by accepting an oil refinery on its coast, would begin to contribute its fair share to New England’s overall economic development. An oil-poor, energy-intensive region, New England needed the port for smaller independent dealers, Easley argued, to break the monopoly of the major oil companies. Laying aside a bleak picture of regional victimization, Easley painted a vibrant future based on competitive energy prices and regional economic growth, all resulting from the Machiasport proposal. Easley also dismissed the environmental hazards of a supertanker oil port in regional terms by noting that Machiasport’s remoteness recommended the pro-

posal. The town, he argued, could "handle the super-tankers . . . with a minimum hazard to densely populated areas along the New England seacoast." Easley was clearly willing to sacrifice Maine's underpopulated and politically weak eastern coast in order to benefit the rest of New England. He closed by returning to the regional theme: "This project is the only real hope for a deep water port and refinery on the East Coast that will solve the high energy costs of our forgotten region."¹⁰

Opposition to the Machiasport refinery was also cast in regional terms. A pamphlet prepared and distributed widely by the New England chapter of the Sierra Club articulated the pastoral themes that identified the Maine coast as a regional icon. "Only north of Acadia National Park do substantial stretches of the Maine coast remain free of tourist development and light industry." There the landscape of small farms and fishing villages remained "as it must have been a hundred years ago." A Sierra Club member from Michigan who rented "Snuggle Home Cottage" near the proposed refinery site extolled the picturesque cottages, the rough but scenic twisting roads, the wild, lonely beaches. After a month exploring historical sites, walking the beach, and watching lobster buoys bobbing in the waves, she concluded that Machiasport was "one of the finest unspoiled areas on the shrinking Maine coast." This summer reverie provided dramatic backdrop for enumerating the "all too familiar . . . problems of overcrowding, air and water pollution" the refinery would bring. Passage to the docking site was hazardous because the bay was home to twenty-foot tides, storms, fog, and rocky shoals. A large spill would threaten the Georges Bank, New England's finest offshore fishing grounds, and Maine's tourist industry, worth \$400 million a year, was also at stake.¹¹

Recognizing a need to provide alternatives to the economic stimulus refinery promoters pledged, the Sierra Club suggested that low-impact tourism, based on eastern Maine's isolation, its history, and its beauty, would take up the slack. For readers bothered by the irony of promoting isolation as a means to increase the number of tourists, the Sierra Club offered another proposal: federal subsidies to offset lost income, if the area accepted national zoning and preservation controls. Local towns would be compensated "for surrendering their right to develop." Those individuals who chose not to stay and "work hard for relatively meager incomes" could simply "move away."¹²

With the oil issue framed in regional terms, Maine's public officials entered the debate. Like the New England Council, Governor Curtis approved the Machiasport site for political reasons: he thought that local

resistance would be minimal on the remote and economically depressed eastern coast. Nevertheless, it would have been nearly impossible to locate an oil port anywhere on the Maine coast that was not within the view of at least a few influential summer residents, and Curtis's choice of Starboard Island in outer Machias Bay did just that.¹³

The summer resident happened to be Gardner Means, a consulting economist from Washington D.C. Means was undoubtedly shocked at the announcement that his summer view might now include super-tankers, pipelines, oil refinery stacks, and tank farms, but he was too astute to launch a direct attack on the proposal. As a nonvoting outsider—a “summer complaint” in local parlance—his protest would lack the ring of authenticity. Means initiated Maine's first local response to the oil proposal by posing a series of seemingly reasonable and balanced questions that did not purport to commit the questioner to a firm position for or against the proposal.


Means posed his questions as an appointed member of Governor Curtis's own Council of Economic Advisors. In September 1968, the council sent the governor a list of ten questions, drafted principally by Means. How much, the Council asked, would be added to development costs if the proposed refinery was relocated inland, so as to minimize “the deleterious effects upon a particularly beautiful portion of the coastline?” Were the opportunities for ancillary industries—petrochemicals, shipbuilding, a container port—realistic? Had the effects of possible air and water pollution on clams, lobsters, fish, blueberries, tourism, and recreation been investigated adequately? The questions were not to be taken as a negative view, but rather as an opportunity for “thorough consideration” of a wider range of issues. The council avoided challenging Governor Curtis outright, but its inventory of threatened land and water resources implied that he had acted precipitously. Overall, the council advocated “more study”—a delay which gave the opposition time to organize.¹⁴

Anticipating more overt controversy, Curtis appointed an ad hoc Conservation and Planning Committee on the Machiasport Project, dominated by his own subordinates and local officials who favored the refinery. The committee reiterated the regional theme, suggesting that the only real opposition came from the major oil firms. Local participants assured the governor's representatives that their neighbors favored the project, as long as no pollution would result. Having fulfilled its intent—to give an appearance of careful deliberation and study—the committee disappeared from the public debate.¹⁵

Act 2. "A Somewhat Overripe Mackerel"

With the Machiasport proposal stalled in the federal permitting process, a second supertanker port proposal, sponsored by King Resources Company, targeted the densely populated Casco Bay region near Portland. Portland Harbor was already the second largest importer of crude oil on the East Coast, servicing, among other things, a major pipeline from Montreal. The additional facilities, to be located at an unused Navy oil terminal on Long Island, would make Portland the world's largest oil importing port by volume. Mindful of these benefits, the Portland City Council quickly rezoned the Long Island site to accommodate King Resources. This action energized local opponents, who gathered over two thousand signatures and organized Maine's first grassroots anti-oil organization under the name Citizens Who Care (CWC).¹⁶

Coming on the heels of the Machiasport controversy and a disastrous oil spill in California's Santa Barbara channel, the Portland oil terminal proposal generated an outpouring of public commentary. Aware



Large oil tankers, like this one belonging to the Pittston Company, were anathema to those concerned with preserving both the ecological health and the pastoral beauty of the Maine coast. From The Pittston Company, "Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine," April 19, 1973.

Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.

of the potential for controversy in the vote-rich Portland area, Curtis confined his public statements to Machiasport, maintaining a neutral stance on the Portland project. Despite his attempt to smooth the troubled waters, by 1969 coastal preservation had come to dominate political discussions in Maine. In 1969 NRCM and Maine Audubon Society (MAS), two groups emerging as Maine's most active environmental organizations, formed the Coastal Resources Action Committee (CRAC), a full-time lobbying organization led by Republican lawyer-lobbyist Horace Hildreth and his Democratic counterpart, Harold Pachios.¹⁷

CRAC's founding underscored the professionalization of the environmental movement. Operating in a world of powerful industrial and labor interests, Hildreth and Pachios were both familiar with the process of drafting legislation, negotiating compromises, and working within the system of legislative politics. In the ensuing controversy, Maine's environmental organizations gained a remarkably professional veneer, yet unlike the outside organizations that initiated the controversy, they remained tuned to local perspectives of people living and working on the coast. Playing on these concerns, the NRCM quoted Robert Monks, a Maine-based oil promoter with the demeanor of a Boston Brahmin who had dismissed the threat to coastal fisheries offhandedly. If local fishermen could "run lobster boats, they can run [oil-spill] clean-up boats" as well, he said. Highlighting Monks's disdain for the local fishing community, the NRCM offered the folk wisdom of lobsterman Jasper Cates, who talked in more meaningful terms about the impact of the refinery on "our livelihoods, our environment, and our way of life."¹⁸

Sensitive to a changing popular mood on the coast, the NRCM introduced a theme rarely articulated in Maine: local aversion to population growth. The predicted spin-off industries—petrochemicals, pulp and paper, aluminum, metal products, perhaps shipbuilding—would create more jobs than Maine's "current population" could fill, the NRCM warned, meaning a "rapid migration into the area . . . overwhelming both the natural environment and the way of life of the present inhabitants."¹⁹

The message gained currency along the coast. Oil promoters had argued time and again that tanker ports and refineries would allow Maine a "share in the nation's riches." Heavy industry meant a broader tax base for sewage treatment plants, schools, low-cost housing, streets; it meant better connections, more businesses, and above all, more jobs. And yet along Maine's eastern coast, insularity and sense of place bred fear of such changes, especially when initiated by outside promoters. One Downeaster worried that economic progress would bring "whorehouses

and gambling casinos . . . as they have in New York, New Jersey and other places where oil refineries are located." The intangibles of the development question—noise, traffic, waste problems, air and water pollution, crime, big government, corporate domination, loss of traditions and community control—worried local residents. Unlike Boston-based promoters and preservationists, NRCM and CRAC learned to articulate their point of view in consonance with the subtle fears and concerns drifting through coastal communities.²⁰

Aware that they could not "sit back and relish the prospect of a region preserved like some curiosity in amber," the NRCM offered to cooperate with state development planners to develop more sophisticated economic alternatives. "The imagination and energy [they] . . . summoned in the cause of preservation" would be "put at the service of the state in solving Washington County's very real economic problems." The NRCM suggested promoting small businesses on the model of rural Scotland's electronics industry and Canada's aquaculture experiments. Environmentalists would transform Maine's fixation on growth by appending the key word "clean" to industrial development.²¹

With Maine people closely tuned to the controversy over two pending oil proposals, the issue moved inexorably to the state legislature. In 1969 Republicans and Democrats reached a consensus that projected their sensitivity to both the economic needs and the traditional values of coastal life: oil could come to Maine (the prodevelopment stance) as long as it did not harm the environment (the anti-oil stance). To achieve this balancing act, the House of Representatives created an interim committee to study ways of ensuring the safe transportation of oil along the Maine coast. The committee was chaired by Harrison Richardson, a Portland-area lawyer and liberal Republican with ambitions for higher office.²²

The House resolution establishing Richardson's committee drew attention to the vulnerability of the Maine coast. Oil spills could not be eliminated, the committee recognized, and although they might be infrequent, the effect could be catastrophic. By unanimous vote, the bipartisan committee recommended a measure considered by *Newsweek* magazine to be one of the "nation's strongest antipollution bills ever": a spill abatement program lodged in the Environmental Improvement Commission (EIC) and funded by a tax on oil imported at Maine coast terminals. According to *Newsweek*, "Outraged industrial lobbyists sputtered in disbelief, especially now that Maine's deep-water ports . . . have put the state on the verge of an oil bonanza."²³

On the House floor, the debate generated a profusion of bipartisan

rhetoric proclaiming fidelity to the Maine coast. Intended largely as campaign fodder—approval was already a foregone conclusion—the debate demonstrated the growing power of Maine’s pastoral images over the legislative process. Richardson opened the debate by pointing out the national significance of Maine’s coast. Economically, Maine was viewed as a “sort of . . . weak sister of the continental United States,” he conceded, but in this instance its underdevelopment offered an advantage: Maine could avoid the mistakes already made by its more industrialized counterparts. Democrat John Jalbert confirmed the bipartisan commitment to the pastoral ideal, recalling the days when industry was “in complete control” of Maine’s natural landscape, and fumes from the polluted rivers peeled paint from nearby buildings. “We have the most beautiful coastline in America, and a tourist business and fishing and lobstering business[es] that will disappear unless we are able to place meaningful controls on a conveyancing of oil.” Maine, according to Jalbert, could lead the nation with responsible legislation, and at the same time “give our own citizens the protection they need and that they deserve.” His speech was followed by several other tributes to the “rock-bound coast of Maine, revered by people throughout the world,” and the bill passed by a highly unusual vote of 134 to 1.²⁴

Legislation enacted by a vote of 134 to 1 contains a variety of unstated compromises. For his part, Governor Curtis had gone from labeling the NRCM a “bunch of conservative Republicans [who] . . . like Maine just fine the way it is” to active cooperation with the newly professionalized environmental establishment. In fact, by the time the bill passed, all sides had reached agreement. Curtis published statements supporting the legislation; oil and environmental lobbyists joined the negotiations, and committee hearings on the bill generated “massive” demonstrations of public support.²⁵

While back room negotiations probably explain the nearly unanimous vote on the Oil Conveyancing Act, this consensus was unusual, given the emotional tenor of the process. The debate and vote reflect a release of long-standing frustration with Maine’s status as New England’s poor country cousin. In the oil controversy, Mainers of all kinds were beginning to savor the new importance of their coast as a deep water resource and as a pastoral sanctuary. Big industry, urban New England, and the nation at large seemed to need Maine. The state’s nineteenth-century motto, *Dirigo* (“I Lead”), assumed new significance as the legislative special session garnered nationwide media attention. Representative Jalbert’s remark about the “eyes of the nation” on Maine ar-

articulated an emotional sensitivity entirely new to the chronically depressed state. According to the *New York Times*, "the magnitude of support for these imaginative conservation measures . . . demonstrates not only the good sense of the people of Maine, but the power of a good idea whose time has finally come."²⁶

The Oil Conveyancing Act was accompanied by another bill that allowed the EIC to regulate site location for large industrial developments. Endorsed by a two-to-one margin, the Site Location Bill attracted far less attention than its companion legislation, but was destined to have more impact on the evolution of environmental consciousness in Maine. The law established two new procedures: a form of "spot zoning" for developments over twenty acres, to be administered by state, rather than local, government and a procedure mandating public hearings on controversial projects. In a mostly rural state unused to any form of public land-use planning or zoning, but with a long tradition of contentious local town meetings, the law seemed tailored to raising grassroots environmental awareness.²⁷

The standards set by the act were an invitation to controversy: a project would be approved if the developer had the financial and technical capacity to ensure that it would fit "harmoniously into the existing natural environment" and that it would not "adversely affect existing uses, scenic character, natural resources or property values in the municipality or in adjoining municipalities." The political implications of the new law were first tested in connection with the King Resources super-tanker port proposal for Portland's Long Island. A source of public controversy for over two years, the project had already polarized public opinion. EIC Chair Donaldson Koons predicted that the meetings would be a learning experience for everyone; an expectation borne out by subsequent events.²⁸

On a hot, muggy afternoon in May, 1970, a crowd of citizens gathered in a Portland high school gymnasium for the first meeting under the new Site Location Law. Problems with the public address system augured for a generally chaotic meeting: speakers shouted, the audience called for louder voices, and tempers rose, all familiar experiences for Mainers used to annual town meeting. Organized resistance was spearheaded by CWC, by now a veteran grassroots fighter, while a new Maine Citizens Oceanology Alliance, claiming 500 members, added support. King Resources got "only two tentative and timid claps," while Koons had to gavel for order several times to halt applause for the opponents. A steady parade of homemakers, small business owners, summer resi-

dents, fishermen, and property owners kept the meeting lively through the long afternoon and evening. Business reporter Frank Sleeper found the seven hour hearing lengthy, disorganized, and emotional: a “wearying” session. Chairman Koons tried to confine debate to the narrow issue of how the King pier would affect the environment, but he was overwhelmed by the “mass of emotion” focused on the broader implications of the tanker port. The hearings provide ample evidence of the extent to which the oil controversy had, by 1970, penetrated local consciousness.²⁹

Representatives from King Resources began the hearing by observing that Portland Harbor was already a major oil port, with extensive tank farms lining its inner shores. The proposed supertanker pier, located in the outer harbor, would have the latest pollution safeguards, and to accommodate aesthetic sensibilities the storage tanks and buildings would be painted “soft green and white . . . to maintain the motif of an island village.” A row of trees would screen the facility from the neighboring town of Falmouth. Oil terminals, they asserted, were located at “some of the most prominent and elegant beaches throughout the world.”³⁰

This entreaty drew support from a scattered audience contingent interested in jobs. One group of Long Island residents presented a petition supporting the project, and one local predicted that if Mainers remained hostile to projects like this Portland’s youth would “have to move to Philadelphia to find work in a refinery and come up here in summer.” The King representatives closed on a note of frustration: “By now, we have lost track of the public hearings . . . Our critics have had thirteen months and I have heard nothing new. If there is homework to be done, King Resources Company has done it. We would like to get on with our job.”³¹

These complaints only stimulated the opposition. Since the hearing was informal, the audience was allowed to pose questions directly from the floor. CRAC lobbyist Harold Pachios asked if King intended to expand the facility later to service even larger tankers. Receiving an indefinite reply, he continued his badgering, prompting an angry declaration that King’s future plans were “none of your business.” Others joined in the fray, touching off a lengthy exchange between the audience and the commissioners, again reminiscent of the sometimes rough-and-tumble proceedings at a Maine town meeting.³²

It was clear that the commissioners felt a need to educate the public on the purpose of the Site Location Law, but it was also clear that citizens were more interested in provoking heated argument than in learning the finer points of hearing protocol. A shout from the audience that

"a majority of Maine people don't want the oil industry at all," brought Commissioner Delogu's response that the question was not "subject to popular vote." Another CRAC lawyer, Horace Hildreth, Jr., began baiting King representatives with questions, irrelevant to the hearing, about plans to construct a refinery. When this was ruled out of order, Hildreth turned to the crowd: "I share [your] frustration . . . in trying to find out what is King Resources [sic] really up to." Rapping his gavel for order, Koons responded sarcastically: "If you are quiet, you may . . . have a chance to find out."³³

As the afternoon wore on into the evening, erudite witnesses and folk philosophers demonstrated varying abilities to express the feelings of the audience, clearly weighted against King Resources. Concerns raised about the project's impact on residential property values, scenic integrity, and the Casco Bay quality of life, earned more or less sustained applause. The final effect of the project, as local legislator Mary Payson put it, was akin to "dropping a somewhat overripe mackerel on the doorsteps of Falmouth." A representative of Keep Oil Out (KOO), one of several emerging opposition groups, attempted to pass out oil soaked postcards to the commissioners, who refused the gift.³⁴

The hearing fully engaged the complex environmental constituency emerging out of the oil port issue. Town officials from Portland's suburbs focused on the lack of comprehensive planning for Casco Bay; fishers and boatbuilders expressed fears of more pollution; marine scientists spoke of the economic potential of aquaculture; residents and recreationists worried about oil on their "white, white beaches." The varied concerns were perhaps best summarized by Ellis O'Brien, a long-time resident who argued that Maine was at a crossroads: "Twenty years ago, we would have had to jump like a fish at bait if somebody like King Resources [came to Maine] . . . There was no alternative." Maine was still economically weak, but O'Brien and people like him had learned to embrace this unique working landscape of small, traditional activities as a place "where people can get out of the cities and go to live." This new pastoral sensitivity, as O'Brien concluded, was "inconsistent, to say the least . . . with industrial development." Defending the bay from "arrogant industrialists," witnesses politicized the rustic metaphors at the core of Maine's self-identity.³⁵

The EIC voted against the Long Island project on grounds that it posed too great a risk to recreational assets in the Casco Bay region. While this decision was eventually reversed by the Maine Supreme Court, the promoter went bankrupt in the interim and the project was

abandoned. The controversy was thus decided by broader economic developments, but politically it was a crucial moment for Maine's emerging grassroots constituency. The tanker port hearings crystallized the major themes of Maine's new environmental consciousness: a new, proud self-awareness of Maine's unique gift to the nation; a reminder of past injustices at the hands of outside interests; a sense of pastoral abundance; a vision of change that could be directed away from the mistakes of America's industrial past. Such optimism was new to Maine, and it energized people like Ellis O'Brien, spreading environmental concern well beyond the issue of an oil dock in Portland's back yard. Maine's traditional town meeting dialogue had been transformed into an environmental revival meeting.³⁶

Act 3. The Meaning of "Clean"

While the King Resources oil port was under review, a third proposal was initiated in 1971 by yet another independent oil promoter. Fuel Desulphurization, Inc. was created to help New York Consolidated Edison meet air quality standards for its metropolitan generating facilities. When the promoter was blocked by local zoning officials and outraged citizens in suburban New York, it turned to Maine, hoping to convert its federal license into a project that would serve Boston area utilities' similar needs for low sulphur fuel. Renamed Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., the company first approached South Portland, home to Maine's largest concentration of existing oil facilities. But King Resources had already spoiled the ground. When thousands of citizens signed petitions opposing the idea, South Portland officials reversed their initial positive response. Promoters looked for a site as yet unencumbered by Maine's new environmental consciousness.³⁷

Politically, Maine Clean Fuels' second choice was even less astute. The Penobscot Bay town of Searsport was physically suitable and economically convenient, with an existing industrial harbor and a rail connection, but the supertankers would have to pass through a section of the coast renowned for its tourism, in-shore fisheries, and yachting. The midcoast harbored summer homes for some of the nation's wealthiest families. For just this reason Governor Curtis remained aloof from the Maine Clean Fuels project, but promoters found sufficient local support to push ahead.³⁸

The opposition opened by organizing public meetings in the lower

bay towns, and the region's summer people began a letter-writing campaign that landed over 1,200 letters on the governor's desk. Intending to demonstrate that it, too, had substantial public support, Maine Clean Fuels staged a meeting in Searsport, announcing ahead of time that only local residents would be admitted. To enforce the "locals only" rule, company officials posted uniformed guards at the entrance to the gymnasium where the meeting was to be held. State police with riot gear stood in reserve. While only about 200 citizens entered the building, another 800 milled around outside with placards and anti-oil literature. When police and local officials decided to open the gym to everyone, the moderator attempted to maintain decorum by redefining the meeting as an informational session. Although the protesters eventually quieted down, they had more than made their point; the event succeeded only in portraying the company as a political novice with villainous overtones.³⁹

By the time the EIC held Site Location Permit hearings in March 1971, eleven of the fifteen towns around the lower Penobscot Bay had voted against the project. Determined to avoid the town meeting-style badgering they had experienced at Portland, the commissioners established strict rules to control testimony and witness qualifications. Audience members were required to submit all questions in writing to the EIC chair and applause was prohibited. Commission Chair Donaldson Koons opened the hearings with a warning to the audience to avoid emotional displays: All testimony was to be "factual and should address itself to the issues." Koons then read a letter from Governor Curtis who cautioned that Maine people should put their faith in the Site Location Law as a guarantee of the state's environmental integrity. Under these restraints, the hearing was reduced to a string of "long, tedious and repetitious testimony"; the initial attendance of over 700 persons dwindled to about 200 per day. Thus while the opening scenes of the drama had been vociferous and demonstrative, the middle scenes were more earnest and determined, dominated by a professional presentation style.⁴⁰

During the hearings, Maine Clean Fuels stressed the safety of its sophisticated pollution prevention equipment and the economic benefits that would flow from the project. Company president David Scoll referred to the 900 page application and promised even more data on air and water quality, noise abatement, and protection of the marine environment. Shifting to the central legal issue in the application, whether the project would adversely impact "existing uses," Scoll provided a slide show demonstrating that the Searsport area was already industrialized. Scoll was followed by supporters representing pulp and paper, railroad,

and trucking firms, the Searsport port authority, and local citizen groups. A Maine State Labor Council official reiterated Maine's traditional concern for jobs: "Many argue that Maine's scenic coastline will be ruined by the refinery. But what does the presence of substandard housing and tarpaper shacks do to enhance our coastline? How do people who are poorly attired, undernourished and ravaged by ill health contribute to a scenic view?" Dividing Mainers into wealthy preservationists and forward-thinking humanists was a common mode of political discourse in the debate. Columnist Donald Hansen suggested that since Penobscot Bay was simply a "private domain" for the privileged, it was not worth preserving. To struggling mill town residents, "all this pious talk about saving the Maine coast must seem so much baloney when you can't get to it."⁴¹

There was substance to the argument that wealthy summer visitors were active in the anti-oil campaign, but by 1971 the issue was far more complex. In fact, opposition cut across Maine's heterogeneous coastal population, which included retirees and summer residents but also fishers, farmers, small business owners, and service workers. Local organizers gathered 23,315 signatures on a petition against the project, easily outnumbering those submitted by the oil proponents. Notwithstanding the commissioners' disclaimers about a popular plebiscite, this kind of grassroots opposition weighed heavily in the debate.⁴²

The most convincing arguments against the refinery came from ordinary citizens whose claim to authority lay in their lifelong experience on the coast. With an air of authenticity and ownership, Ossie Beal, president of the Maine Lobstermen's Association, focused on the threats to his own livelihood, demonstrating the stern self-interest and local understanding that had become so convincing in statewide press coverage. The refinery, he argued, threatened the lobster, clam, and marine worm fisheries. "We who have spent our lives on the coast of Maine are familiar with its strong tides, its heavy fog, its rocky shoals and severe storms, [and] believe it to be one of the riskiest places to handle oil. For this reason we believe that spills are inevitable." Beal's local knowledge was clearly more impressive than the promoters' promises and statistical projections.⁴³

Adding to this testimony were several Maine coast retirees who drew their authority from life experiences in more industrialized settings. Elliot Preston, a retired chemical engineer from Pittsburgh, drew a compelling contrast between the pastoral dream and the industrial nightmare: "It can only be the purest wishful thinking to believe that through

some mysterious alchemy a refinery and oil port can exist without the attendant industrial, obnoxious atmosphere that is an integral part [of] . . . refinery technology." Likewise, a retired oil tanker captain, Karsten Pendersen, testified that the approaches to Penobscot Bay were "the most dangerous along the East Coast."⁴⁴

The Searsport hearings closed after eight days. Maine Clean Fuels was allowed to revise its plans further, but this was of no avail. The EIC found that the promoter had failed to present adequate evidence on more than ten key points and denied the application. Most important, the company had not demonstrated that an oil complex could "fit harmoniously into the existing natural environment" and the existing uses of the Penobscot Bay region. Bridging the gap between locals and "summer people," preservationists won the day.⁴⁵

Public testimony on the Searsport oil promotion represented the high-water mark of the emerging environmentalist political culture in Maine. Never again would the issues seem so clear, and never again would they be so simply stated as they were during those eight days in Searsport. Promoters repeated the tried and true formula of prosperity and progress based on industrialization; opponents stressed the public claims to the coast as the font of Maine's pastoral identity. White beaches and white hats aligned against black oil in a straight yes-or-no proposition.

Act 4. Planning To Manage The Environmentalist Majority

After the Searsport hearings the focus of the oil controversy shifted to professional planning. With the shadow of "big oil" still hanging over the coast, state regulators and organized environmentalists determined that comprehensive planning would be preferable to decision making through the contentious town meeting model. Instead of waiting for outside promoters to initiate specific proposals, they formed a new partnership to examine all sides of the issue and deliver a decision to the legislature and the people of Maine. Although statewide planning failed to resolve the oil controversy, this professional approach would have far-reaching implications for later environmental issues.

The new emphasis on comprehensive planning suggested that the door was still open to oil development somewhere on the Maine coast. With this understanding, in 1971 EIC Chair Koons asked Governor Curtis to create a task force to survey potential sites. Curtis was receptive;

during the three long years of controversy he had conceded only that the refinery should be located inland from the supertanker port, and that the mid-Maine coast was inappropriate for oil port development. But as long as the initiative lay with the oil promoters, Maine was open to an endless round of hearings like those at Portland and Searsport. The momentum against oil might become politically irreversible.⁴⁶


On November 10, 1971, Governor Curtis appointed twenty-two people to a new Task Force on Energy, Heavy Industry, and the Maine Coast. Included were legislators, environmentalists, civic leaders, academics, business owners, bankers, and a lobsterman. In his instructions, Curtis pointed to the conflicting pressures from those who looked to the coast “as a source of jobs in a time of high unemployment, recreation and solitude in a time of urban unrest, marine resources in a time of worrisome food projections, energy during an energy shortage, tax dollars to relieve unfair property taxes, and profit in a declining economy.” The Task Force was to minimize these conflicts by categorizing potential development sites, sparing the state the “costs and confusions of continual heavy industrial speculation over the whole length of the Maine coast.” Planning would provide the overarching political authority that had eluded the administration during the public hearings. The Task Force took this instruction literally, making no effort to assess public feeling under the assumption that the report would be “more useful for not having been tailored to meet subsequent public reaction.”⁴⁷

During the Task Force’s eight month review of the coast situation, Curtis continued to prepare ground for public acceptance of this new approach to the oil controversy. In what journalists called a “minor miracle,” CRAC agreed with unnamed industrialists that the state should designate a single oil port for Maine. As the Task Force was completing its final report, however, the oil tanker *Tamano* ran aground off Portland Harbor, creating the most serious oil spill in Maine history. While this seemed prescient to oil opponents, the Task Force brushed off the event and recommended Portland as Maine’s single oil port. The compromise was clear: Maine would preserve its coast by sacrificing Portland, already the state’s most industrialized harbor.⁴⁸

Although calculated to bring opposite sides together, the recommendation succeeded only in dividing coastal residents; some opposed all development, while others worried that without tanker ports Maine would be isolated from the economic mainstream, like a “giant state park.” John Cole, the outspoken editor of the *Maine Times*, accepted the premise that oil development somewhere in Maine was “inevitable.”

CRAC founder Horace Hildreth did not. These divisions became clear in May 1972 when the Army Corps of Engineers held hearings in Portland as part of a general survey of East Coast deep water ports. CWC, MAS, and the Sierra Club opposed designating Portland as Maine's oil port; NRCM and CRAC were conspicuously absent. The planning approach to resolving the oil controversy failed, largely because it split the environmental movement, even as environmentalism was achieving its broadest popular support in Maine. The consequences became apparent when the bill implementing the Task Group report was introduced in the 1973 legislature. Environmentalists categorically opposed to oil anywhere on the coast united with industrialists categorically opposed to state attempts to limit private oil initiatives and, together, they defeated the bill.⁴⁹

With central planning out of the picture after 1973, new oil promotions appeared, often with environmentalists on both sides of the issue.




Pittston Company map showing Eastport location in relation to existing terminals in the northeast. "Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine," April 19, 1973.

Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.

Hearings had become courtlike procedures. With strong backing from the governor, NRCM, and former CRAC lobbyist Harold Pachios, the independent Gibbs Oil Company proposed a pipeline carrying crude oil from Portland Harbor to an inland refinery at Sanford. Harrison Richardson, preparing a bid for the governor's seat, supported the Gibbs proposal and expressed frustration with Maine's overly complicated environmental regulations. The state's number one priority was jobs, he claimed; as governor, he would work to soften Maine's anti-industry image. According to Pachios, opponents of industrial development were typically "well off, and they don't want change." After lengthy site location hearings, years of effort, and millions of dollars in expenses, the project was abandoned due to falling oil prices.⁵⁰

With the statewide planning concept in shambles, the Maine coast received one last oil proposal. Unlike the others, the Pittston Company plan for a refinery at Eastport, near the Canadian border, seemed doomed from the start. It called for construction of one of nation's largest refineries at the end of a narrow, twisting coastal passage on a fog-shrouded coast renowned for huge tides and swift currents. Head Harbour Passage, moreover, lay in international waters, and the Canadian government steadfastly refused to jeopardize its local fisheries. Moreover, Pittston's lack of corporate responsibility was already legendary. In 1972 a dam at a Pittston coal cleaning plant in Virginia ruptured, burying the town of Buffalo Creek in mud and leaving 125 dead and 4,000 homeless. A \$205 million lawsuit hung over the company while it negotiated for the oil refinery in Eastport. In 1975 the state gave tentative approval to the project, but listed sixty-four conditions to be met before final authorization; over the next two years Pittston did little to meet the conditions. The company's federal applications were equally suspect. Its air quality modeling, for example, lacked local meteorological data. In the event of a refinery spill Pittston simply planned to ignite the oil, an idea those familiar with the region's notoriously heavy weather found appalling. And finally, because the site was near Roosevelt International Park on Campobello Island, the EPA permit came with stringent air emissions requirements, and the area was home to several endangered marine species and nesting bald eagles.⁵¹


Yet local resistance played a decisive role in the long Pittston controversy, confirming a shift in values even in the hard-pressed communities of eastern Maine. A location too remote to attract influential "summer people," Eastport's fate seemed to hang on local support or opposition to "big oil" and its promise of jobs and prosperity. Throughout the contro-



Pittston Company artist's rendering of the proposed oil refinery and marine terminal at Eastport. From The Pittston Company, "Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine," April 19, 1973.
Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.

versy federal officials orchestrated the public hearings as dull renditions of project history and permit processes, and locals were given the impression that the decision was in the hands of "the bureaucrats, not the people." Despite this, and a 20 percent local unemployment rate, local opponents continued to turn out for state and federal hearings, becoming even more vocal and more strident in their anticorporate overtones as the controversy dragged on. At a 1975 meeting before state officials, nearly a third of the 150 who attended rose to speak and all but a few opposed the project.⁵²

Given the unending round of permit hearings and the dogged resistance in Eastport, the issue faded from public view when oil prices stabilized in the late 1970s. With the defeat of King Resources, Maine Clean Fuels, and now Pittston, it appeared that the Maine coast was free of impending threat. There was, as journalist Richard Saltonstall pointed out, always the possibility that "sooner or later a big league corporation would present a concrete plan . . . supported by reams of data to answer every conceivable question," and the quandary of underdevelopment would drive home the logic of oil port development. But the victory over



Schematic of Pittston Company's proposed oil refinery and terminal at Eastport. "Prospectus for a 250,000 BPD Refinery and Marine Terminal at Eastport, Maine," April 19, 1973. *Courtesy Special Collections Fogler Library, University of Maine.*

"big oil was part of a nationwide shift in thinking about the costs and benefits of energy development. Controversies like the offshore oil and gas leases on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the TVA's Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee, the Seabrook nuclear energy plant in New Hampshire, the Kaiparowitz coal fired generating plant in Utah, and the oil-shale proposals in Colorado correlated with Maine's shift in thinking about growth, energy, and quality of life.⁵³

Conclusion

Reflecting on the events of the early 1970s, editor John Cole mused about the appearance of a "populist, top-to-bottom, rich-to-poor, right-to-left, universal constituency" raised to defend Maine's pastoral landscape: "It's as if this corner of America, parked for two centuries in a geographic and economic backwater, has been banked all these years just so it could be here when Americans decided for the first time since the Industrial Revolution that there may be a better way." By popularizing pastoralism as an alternative to industrial growth, the oil controversy served as midwife to a grassroots environmental movement. Hence-

forth, nature would be given due consideration in all manner of development proposals.⁵⁴

In the early years of this debate Robert Monks had raised a question that few intelligent politicians would have dared to ask publicly: if indeed Maine succeeded in holding industry at bay, must it then do everything in its power, "through social, economic and political initiatives, to keep people where historical accident put them a hundred years ago?" Wilderness advocates in the west might have pondered Monks's question seriously, but in Maine the integrity of the pastoral landscape still signified a people imbedded comfortably in a natural world, the folk being as important an ingredient in the Downeast landscape as nature. Thus as the curtain rang down on "big oil," the *Maine Times* once again took up the question of jobs, cognizant that some had defended Pittston only because their communities had no better economic options. Editor Peter Cox proposed a new "marine trades center" at a closed cannery complex in Eastport and new light industrial uses for Eastport's deep water wharf. Others counseled only further patience. "If people hung on . . . the area could prosper under controlled development of its recreational assets, even as a summer colony based on arts and crafts . . . or new kind of national park," journalist Richard Saltonstall suggested. Once again Maine seemed to have time to craft a vision for its unique blend of natural and scenic resources, time to gain perspective on America's headlong dash to techno-utopia. Cox noted in governing circles a lingering feeling that "Maine has nothing to offer itself, and so must court people from outside to come in and take advantage of us." But most Mainers, he thought, seemed ready to abandon the "big bang solution" to economic problems. Maine's best chance was as it always had been: a slow accumulation of diversified small industries attracted to the state's varied natural resources and to its hard-working, enterprising people. "Organic" growth—making bricks from local clays, raising mussels and oysters, harvesting seaweed for fertilizer, manufacturing windmills, cabinets, and other secondary products from local woods, printing, and perhaps an agricultural resurgence geared to greater regional self-sufficiency—spelled the future for the Maine coast. During the protracted fight, popular thinking about Maine's growth strategies had come full circle: small industries and a rural folk eking out an independent living once again provided the image, if not the reality of life on the coast.⁵⁵

Maine had gained much from the performances of the "theater of oil." By the mid-1970s the state had passed landmark legislation that

lodged veto power over heavy industry in the state planning apparatus. Perhaps more important, the battle for the coast drew national attention to Maine's distinction as a postindustrial sanctuary for all of the Northeast, and in the process advanced the environmental message immeasurably. Energized by public hearings and by multiple threats to a familiar way of life, statewide organizations and grassroots groups gained confidence, experience, and an audience well beyond their initial upper-class base. This company of vacationers, hunters, anglers, hikers, backpackers, women's club and civic group members, PTA leaders, journalists, scientists, politicians, and the "many Mainers who live in urban areas but who have camps and cottages on the coast, [or] on the lakes" remained the heart and soul of Maine environmentalism. The themes articulated in the "theater of oil"—the limits of technology, the pressures of development, the specter of 70 million urban and suburban dwellers within a day's drive of Maine—committed Maine's environmentalist majority to a new cultural construction of their state.⁵⁶

NOTES

Portions of this article were co-authored with Richard Judd in the preparation of our forthcoming book, *Nature States: The Environmental Imagination in Maine, Oregon, and the Nation*.

1. "Fellow Americans: Keep Out!" *Forbes* 107 (June 15, 1971): 22-23; Pacific Power and Light official quoted in Keith Montgomery Carr, "Changing Environmental Perceptions, Attitudes, and Values in Oregon's Willamette Valley: 1800 to 1978" (Master's thesis, University of Oregon, 1978), 137.

2. L. Morrill Burke, "The Room We Live In," *Maine Sunday Telegram*, July 13, 1969.

3. Walt and Rosaline Morey, *Land Use Oregon 1* (June 15, 1974): 3.

4. *Kennebec Journal*, June 10, 1970; *Bangor Daily News*, April 6, 1970. Kenneth P. Hayes, *As Envisioned by Maine People: A Report to the Commission on Maine's Future* (Orono, ME: Social Science Research Institute, 1976), 8, 18, 86.

5. Governor Kenneth M. Curtis Papers, box 17, file "Machiasport Project," Maine State Archives, Augusta, ME (hereafter MSA). See also the correspondence between John Evans and Kenneth Curtis from September 7, 1967 to January 21, 1969.

6. Frank Graham, Jr., *Oil and the Maine Coast: Is it Worth It?* (Augusta: Natural Resources Council of Maine, 1970), 5-6.

7. Curtis in Richard Saltonstall, Jr., *Maine Pilgrimage: The Search for an American Way of Life* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 49-50. See

Richard Pardo, "Something Up, Down East," *American Forests* 75 (May 1969): 45; *Maine Times*, February 21, 1969, March 12, 1975; *Maine Sunday Telegram*, February 20, November 5, 1972.

8. *Maine Times*, March 12, 1975; *Kennebec Journal*, June 10, 1970. *Maine Sunday Telegram*, November 5, 1972; *Kennebec Journal*, June 10, 1970. See also Neal R. Peirce, *The New England States: People, Politics and Power in the Six New England States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), 412-13; *Maine Times*, February 21, 1969.

9. Maine State Legislature, Maine Legislative Research Committee, *Report on Coastal Conveyance of Petroleum Products to First Special Session of the 104th Legislature* (Augusta 1970), 1.

10. A. Thomas Easley, *An Atlantic World Port and Oil Refinery for New England* (Boston: New England Council for Economic Development, 1968).

11. Keith Roberts, *Machiasport: Oil and the Maine Coast* (Boston: Eastern New England Groups of the Sierra Club, August 1969), ii, iii, 26-28.

12. Roberts, *Machiasport*, i, v, 30.

13. Peter A. Bradford, *Fragile Structures: A Story of Oil Refineries, National Security, and the Coast of Maine* (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1975).

14. James Storer to Governor Kenneth Curtis, September 17, 1968, box 17, file "Machiasport Project," Curtis Papers, MSA.

15. Attendance List, Minutes of October 1, 1968 Meeting of the Conservation and Planning Committee for the Machiasport Project, box 17, file "Machiasport Project," Curtis Papers, MSA.

16. Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 42, 145.

17. Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 148-150; 242-251; Peirce, *The New England States*, 400.

18. Quoted in Graham, *Oil and the Maine Coast*, 16.

19. Graham, *Oil and the Maine Coast*, 21, 27.

20. Harold Fenlason in *Maine Times*, December 10, 1976. Saltonstall, *Maine Pilgrimage*, 7-9. *Maine Times*, December 10, 1976; Hayes, *As Envisioned by Maine People*, 87.

21. Graham, *Oil and the Maine Coast*, 2, 16, 35-36.

22. Maine State Legislature, *Legislative Record* (Augusta 1969), July 1, 1969, 4569.

23. *Newsweek*, February 16, 1970. See Russell D. Butcher, "Maine to Regulate Commercial Development," *Living Wilderness* 34 (Summer 1970): 54-5; *Public Laws 1969*, ch. 572, "An Act Relating to Coastal Conveyance of Petroleum"; Maine State Legislature, Legislative Research Committee, *Report on Coastal Conveyance of Petroleum Products* (Augusta 1970), 1-7.

24. Maine State Legislature, *Legislative Record* (Augusta 1970), February 3, 1970, 679-82.

25. Peirce, *The New England States*, 399-402. See also Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 134, 256-260.

26. *New York Times*, February 12, 1970.
27. *Laws of Maine*, 1969, Chap. 571; Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 148, 150.
28. Senator Bennett D. Katz in Maine State Legislature, *Legislative Record* (Augusta 1970), 729-734; 676-678. *Portland Press Herald*, May 20, 1970.
29. *Portland Press Herald*, May 23, 1970. See State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company" (5 vols.).
30. State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company," 1:9-31.
31. State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company," 1:117, 220. See also 1:88-104.
32. State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company," 1:43-55.
33. State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company," 1:59-69; 79.
34. State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company," 1:84, 100, 154-157, 202-211.
35. State of Maine, Environmental Improvement Commission, "In Re: Application of King Resources Company," 1:124, 135, 153-76, 190-202. See also letters in volume 5.
36. Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 273-78; *Maine Sunday Telegram*, May 24, 1970; *Kennebec Journal*, July 9, 1970; *King Resources v. Environmental Improvement Commission*, ME 270 A2d 863, November 19, 1970. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Northeast Region Office, *Island Study Phase III Report on Casco Bay, Maine* (Washington DC, 1967).
37. *Bangor Daily News*, February 8, 1971; Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 302-03; *Waterville Sentinel*, July 20, 1970; *Maine Sunday Telegram*, September 27, 1970.
38. *Lewiston Journal*, April 11, 1964; *Bangor Daily News*, March 14, 1970; *Waterville Sentinel*, February 11, March 3, 1971; Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 303.
39. Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 304, 310; *Waterville Sentinel*, February 4, 6, 1971; *Bangor Daily News*, February 19, 1971.
40. *Bangor Daily News*, March 23, 1971; *Waterville Sentinel*, March 24, 1971; *Kennebec Journal*, March 23, April 13, 1971. Maine Clean Fuels Application; Searsport Transcript, vol. 1, 9-12, Maine Clean Fuels, Searsport, box 16, Department of Environmental Protection Collection, MSA (hereafter Maine Clean Fuels, DEP Collection). *Maine Sunday Telegram*, March 28, 1971.
41. Searsport Transcript, 1:23-38; 519-530, box 16, Maine Clean Fuels, DEP Collection. *Waterville Sentinel*, February 11, March 3, 1971.
42. Searsport Documentary Evidence, 1222, box 18; the proponents offered about 3,000 signatures, Searsport Transcript, 1:531, box 16, Maine Clean Fuels, DEP Collection.

43. Ossie Beal testimony, Searsport Transcript, 2:756-766, box 18, Maine Clean Fuels, DEP Collection. See also Ossie Beal in Saltonstall, *Maine Pilgrimage*, 43.

44. Preston testimony, 1243-1251, box 18; Pendersen testimony, 1227-1290, box 18, Searsport Transcript, Maine Clean Fuels, DEP Collection. See *Maine Times*, July 28, 1978.

45. *Bangor Daily News*, May 21, 1971. The complete text of the EIC report on Sears Island including a 1664 page transcript, 316 exhibits, and 1000 page application in boxes 16 and 17, Maine Clean Fuels, DEP collection.

46. Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 337; *Portland Press Herald*, July 31, 1971.

47. Maine Governor's Task Force on Energy, Heavy Industry, and the Maine Coast, *Final Report* (Augusta 1972), ix-x.

48. Governor's Task Force, *Final Report*, 2-18.

49. *Waterville Sentinel*, March 3, 1971; *Kennebec Journal*, June 10, 1970. See also *Maine Sunday Telegram*, December 19, 1971. John Cole in Saltonstall, *Maine Pilgrimage*, 66; *Maine Sunday Telegram*, December 19, 1971; *Kennebec Journal*, May 16, 1972; *Portland Press Herald*, May 24, 1972; March 15, May 10, 1973; *Maine Times*, January 13, 1978; Maine State Legislature, *Legislative Record* (Augusta 1973) 3681. James Briggs, Maine's senior environmentalist, favored oil at Portland. See *Legislative Record*, 3684-88.

50. *Maine Sunday Telegram*, October 21, December 2, 1973, October 6, 1974; *Waterville Sentinel*, July 12, August 8, October 23, 1973, November 27, 1974; *Kennebec Journal*, June 5, November 14, 1973, *Portland Press Herald*, December 21, 1973, February 14, April 5, August 30, September 28, 1974, January 15, June 10, 1975; Bradford, *Fragile Structures*, 350, 363, 366; *Maine Sunday Times*, October 14, 1973.

51. *Maine Times*, March 7, 1975; February 25, 1977, July 28, 1978, August 25, 1978, September 29, 1978.

52. *Portland Press Herald*, September 30, 1971; *Waterville Sentinel*, March 29, 1973; Saltonstall, *Maine Pilgrimage*, 53. *Maine Times*, December 12, 1975, December 10, 1976, July 28, 1978.

53. Saltonstall, *Maine Pilgrimage*, 45-6. See also *Maine Times*, June 4, 1976.

54. John N. Cole, "Letter from Maine: Oil and Water," *Harper's* 243 (November, 1971): 50.

55. Robert Monks in Saltonstall, *Maine Pilgrimage*, 52-59. *Maine Times*, March 25, 1977, June 4, 1976.

56. *Portland Press Herald*, September 8, 1971. See also *Maine Sunday Telegram*, August 3, 1969.